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Prospero’s Plea: Judgment, Invention, 
and Political Form in The Tempest
Kevin Curran
Theatrical epilogues – onstage speeches addressed to the audience 
at the end of a performance – were a common feature of English 
Renaissance plays. They were typically read rather than memorized, 
sometimes by a character in the play, sometimes by someone else. An 
epilogue asserts the merits of the play it punctuates and asks for audi-
ence approval in the form of applause. Far more epilogues occurred 
in performance than survive in print and of those that do survive, 
most were occasional. That is, they were designed for particular ven-
ues, particular audiences, or particular performances, though some 
epilogues may have been more permanent features of the plays they 
accompanied. What all epilogues have in common is their capacity to 
effect what Robert Weimann describes as a “redistribution of author-
ity in the playhouse.”1 When an epilogue speaker requests applause, 
this changes the relationship between actors and audience and 
between fi ction and life. Playgoers are now expected to do something, 
to respond based on the kind of emotional and intellectual experi-
ence they have had up to that point. The epilogue, in other words, 
draws attention to the active and participatory nature of theatrical 
spectatorship and the degree to which audiences were implicated in 
the imaginative world of the plays they attended. 
This chapter concerns Prospero’s epilogue in The Tempest, a par-
ticularly well-known example of the form and one that has become 
a standard feature of the play in performance. It occurs in the fi nal 
moments of the play, just after Prospero has released the island cast-
aways and set his servant Ariel free. Addressing the audience directly, 
Prospero says,
Now my Charmes are all ore-throwne, 
And what strength I have’s mine owne. 
Which is most faint: now ’tis true 
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I must be heere confi nde by you, 
Or sent to Naples. Let me not 
Since I have my Dukedome got,
And pardon’d the deceiver, dwell 
In this bare Island by your Spell, 
But release me from my bands 
With the helpe of your good hands: 
Gentle breath of yours, my Sailes 
Must fi ll, or else my project failes, 
Which was to please: Now I want 
Spirits to enforce: Art to inchant, 
And my ending is despaire, 
Unlesse I be reliev’d by praier 
Which pierces so, that it assaults 
Mercy it selfe, and frees all faults. 
As you from crimes would pardon’d be,
Let your Indulgence set me free. (2322–41)2
Prospero presents his case to the playgoers who are expected to 
consider two related questions: (1) Was the play good? (2) Has 
Prospero behaved in an ethical manner? In considering these ques-
tions, the audience is being asked not simply to pass judgment, 
but more precisely, to imagine through judgment a future for Pros-
pero, an imaginative addendum to the fi ction presented on stage. If 
the audience disapproves and does not clap, Prospero will remain 
imprisoned on the island. If it approves and does clap, he will return 
to Milan. My aim in the pages that follow is to both historicize 
and theorize the connection between these two seemingly distinct 
requests. First, I will show that Prospero’s epilogue participates not 
only in the theatrical convention of soliciting audience applause, 
but also in an intellectual tradition that views judgment and inven-
tion as closely related concepts. This will involve positioning the 
epilogue in relation to Renaissance performance practices and Aris-
totelian rhetorical theory, two contexts which I suggest fi nd a point 
of intersection in Prospero’s closing speech. The fi nal move of the 
chapter will be to use this historical understanding of Prospero’s 
epilogue to arrive at a new set of insights about the relationship 
between theatrical and political form. For this I will be turning 
to the work of Hannah Arendt and Jacques Rancière in order to 
articulate more precisely how the particulars of Prospero’s epilogue 
instantiate broader philosophical ideas about the place of judgment 
in political life.
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Judgment in the Theater
Printed epilogues in playbooks are an important component of the 
archive of early modern judgment, but they present certain inter-
pretive challenges as well. In particular, these printed texts can give 
the misleading impression that epilogues were stable and enduring 
features of the plays for which they were written when, in fact, they 
were usually composed with a fi rst performance in mind. Because 
they carried a higher-than-usual entrance fee, fi rst performances 
attracted a different kind of audience than one might fi nd at a play 
later in its run. First-performance audiences were composed of 
educated playgoers – precisely the sort of people who might think 
themselves in possession of superior powers of discernment. What is 
more, as Tiffany Stern notes, many at fi rst performances would have 
felt that the high price of admission granted them a right to critique. 
“At publique Stage-Playes,” writes Dudley North in 1645, “whoso-
ever censures” is “entituled to it . . . for his money.”3 This sense of 
entitlement was fueled by the promise of a very real form of theatri-
cal authority since audiences at fi rst performances largely determined 
the fate of the plays they watched. Usually, a new play would only be 
granted a second performance if the audience responded encourag-
ingly to the epilogue.
Epilogues, then, constituted the ritual core of a broadly adjudica-
tory set of conditions that were central to the culture of professional 
theater. Playwrights make frequent reference to this phenomenon. 
The Prologue to John Marston’s play, The Dutch Courtesan (1605), 
for example, admonishes playgoers as follows: 
. . . know that fi rme art cannot feare
Vaine rage: onely the highest grace we pray
Is you’le not taxe, until you judge our Play.
Think and then speake: tis rashnesse, and not wit
To speake what is in passion, and not judgment fi t.4
The audience may acquire a right to judge when they pay their 
entrance fee, but as far as Marston is concerned, judgment also 
requires a certain level of responsibility and skill. It is part of a larger 
rational procedure that originates in thinking and culminates in 
speaking and leaves no place for rash emotionalism. Marston clearly 
harbors some latent skepticism about the ability of theater audiences 
to judge well. Ben Jonson goes further, expressing outright derision 
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at being held in thrall to the tastes of playgoers. In his epistle to the 
1612 quarto of The Alchemist, he opines,
How out of purpose, and place, doe I name Art? When the Professors 
are growne so obstinate contemners of it, and presume on their owne 
Naturalls, as they are deriders of all diligence that way, and, by simple 
mocking at the termes, when they understand not the things, thinke 
to get of wittily with their Ignorance. Nay, they are esteem’d the more 
learned, and suffi cient for this, by the Multitude, through their excellent 
vice of judgment. For they commend Writers, as they doe Fencers, or 
Wrastlers; who if they come in robustly, and put for it with a great deale 
of violence, are receiv’d for the braver fellowes.5 
This is the sort of contemptuousness that Jonson is famous for, but 
his attitude here becomes more understandable when we recall that 
his play Sejanus (1603) was rejected by its fi rst Globe audience and 
never made it past its opening performance.
With its rituals of evaluation, public-theater epilogues bore a 
striking resemblance to the procedures of law courts. A number of 
playwrights even described their relationship to their audiences in 
overtly legal language. In The Novella (1653) by Richard Brome, 
for example, the playwright is imagined as a defendant in a law 
court: “Hee’ll ’bide his triall, and submits his cause / To you the 
Jury.”6 The prologue to Thomas Dekker’s The Wonder of a King-
dom (1636) frets about “what Judges sit to Doome each Play.”7 
And The Coxcomb (1647), by Francis Beaumont, John Fletcher, 
and Philip Massinger, features the sarcastic declaration, “Now ’tis 
to be tri’d / Before such Judges, ’twill not be deni’d / A . . . noble 
hearing.”8 These legal references would have made sense to the 
community of theatergoers in Shakespeare’s time, a sizeable portion 
of which was affi liated with the Inns of Court, the institution that 
trained young men for careers in law.9 A number of playwrights, 
too, had connections with the Inns. John Marston was a member 
of the Middle Temple in the 1590s, as was John Webster, and John 
Ford was admitted in 1602. Ben Jonson, though he did not attend 
the Inns himself, was close friends with prominent jurists such as 
John Seldon, with whom he corresponded about transvestism on 
the stage, and John Hoskyns, who was also a respected poet and 
wit. There was signifi cant overlap between the culture of theater 
and the culture of law in Shakespeare’s time and epilogues consti-
tuted a formally compact instance of this crossing. 
This much we know, then: Prospero’s invocation of audience judg-
ment is part of a larger theatrical convention, one which has clear 
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legal coordinates. What about his invocation of audience imagination? 
I quote the relevant lines once again:
I must be heere confi nde by you, 
Or sent to Naples. Let me not 
Since I have my Dukedome got,
And pardon’d the deceiver, dwell 
In this bare Island by your Spell, 
But release me from my bands 
With the helpe of your good hands: (2326–32)
One way of looking at this passage is as a bid for creative input, and 
to this extent it fi ts comfortably under the umbrella of epilogue con-
vention. As Stern writes, “From a time in theatrical history hard to 
date precisely, some plays on their opening performances were offered 
as mutable texts ready for audience revision.”10 There is evidence of 
this practice in printed playbooks. For example, the prologue to John 
Marston’s Antonio and Mellida (1602) invites the audience to “polish 
these rude Sceanes.”11 Similarly, in Thomas Heywood’s Mayden-Head 
Well Lost (1634), the audience is told, “Our Play is new, but whether 
shaped well / In Act or Seane, Judge you, you best can tell.”12 These 
sorts of invitations made playgoers collaborators in the fi ction. Most 
often, this took the form of cutting. Spectators would communicate 
which parts of the play they didn’t like and these sections would be 
excised for subsequent performances.13 In Prospero’s epilogue, how-
ever, there is something slightly different going on. Here, playgoers are 
not being asked to “polish” or cut; they are being asked to elaborate 
and expand. This difference is important because it means their charge 
is not to perfect something that is already there, but rather to make 
something that is not: namely, a future for Prospero. Judgment, in other 
words, leads to invention in Prospero’s epilogue. Understanding the 
link between these two concepts requires us to look beyond the walls 
of the theater to a larger tradition of rhetorical thought and practice.
Judgment and Invention 
The idea that judgment and invention are fundamentally connected 
would have been familiar to many in Shakespeare’s time, including a 
considerable number of playgoers and playwrights. The link fi nds its 
source in a long tradition of rhetorical learning. Thomas Blundeville’s 
commentary in The Arte of Logicke (1599) is fairly standard. While 
“invention fi nds matter,” Blundeville explains, judgment “frameth, 
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disposeth, and reduceth the same into due forme of argument.”14 This 
formulation derives from Roman rhetorical theory, which has deeper 
roots in Aristotle. Texts like Cicero’s De inventione, the anonymous 
Rhetorica ad Herennium, and Quintilian’s Institutio oratoria describe 
invention (inventio) as the skill of deciding which line of reasoning is 
most likely to strike a particular audience as especially compelling. 
Judgment’s role is to break that line of reasoning down into compo-
nent parts and then arrange them in a sequence calculated to achieve 
maximum persuasiveness.15 Judgment, in other words, turns ideas 
into arguments by lending them organizational form. Along with 
invention, it was an essential component of what Aristotle termed 
the genus iudiciale, the kind of speech typically found in the law 
courts.16 In Shakespeare’s time, anyone with a grammar school edu-
cation was likely to have encountered rhetorical handbooks like De 
inventione, Rhetorica ad Herrenium, and Institutio oratoria, or ver-
nacular manuals like Thomas Wilson’s The Art of Rhetorique (1553), 
which drew on the Roman handbooks.17 Accordingly, Blundeville’s 
simple description of judgment would have sounded familiar to 
many early moderns, including Shakespeare, who would have been 
exposed to rhetorical texts as a student at the King’s New School at 
Stratford-upon-Avon.18
With this in mind, we can begin to see how judgment might 
be conceived as one crucial point along a continuum of creative 
endeavor. For those with some training in rhetorical theory, judg-
ment was a form of making rather than a form of decision, as 
we would now tend to view it. This creative component of judg-
ment is even more apparent in the vernacular literary criticism of 
sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England, which was heavily 
infl uenced by, and sometimes indistinguishable from, rhetorical the-
ory. Central to literary critical judgment was the notion of decorum, 
which involved following carefully prescribed rules about how, for 
example, certain types of characters require the use of certain kinds 
of language, how certain styles of argument require particular meta-
phors, or how a given genre necessitates a specifi c type of plot.19 
These precepts reached Renaissance readers through either direct or 
mediated exposure to the ideas in Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Horace’s 
Ars Poetica, as well as through grammatical and rhetorical commen-
taries attached to the comedies of Plautus and Terence, which were 
among the mainstays of elementary and intermediate education in 
Latin.20 For Renaissance critics and theorists writing in this vein, the 
aesthetic quality and even the moral viability of imaginative writing 
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depended on how well the rules of decorum were followed. Thomas 
Wilson in his pioneering manual, The Arte of Rhetorique, uses the 
word “aptness” for decorum and stresses that writers must choose 
“words most apt for their purpose. In weighty causes grave words 
are thought most needful, that the greatness of the matter may the 
rather appear in the vehemency of their talk.”21 Robert Ascham, in 
The Schoolmaster (1570), prefers the word “propriety,” and tells 
his readers that it applies at all levels of a composition, “in choice 
of words, in framing sentences, in handling of argument, and use 
of right form, fi gure and number.”22 George Puttenham goes on to 
lay out these precepts in impressive detail in The Art of English 
Poesy (1589). Consequently, for many readers in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, the process of appraising the aesthetic worth 
and the moral viability of imaginative writing was guided by sim-
ple questions that linked reading to judging: were laws broken or 
adhered to? What are the implications? Within this general inter-
pretive framework, someone like Sir John Harington could defend 
Ariosto against charges of obscenity by pointing out that “there is 
so meet a decorum in the persons that speak lasciviously, as any of 
judgment must needs allow.”23 
Philip Sidney’s The Defense of Poesy (c.1580; printed 1595) is the 
fi rst attempt at sustained literary criticism in English. In it, Sidney 
expands on the idea that judgment forms the basis of sound reading 
to argue, in addition, that our ability to judge well can be sharpened 
by good poetry. All the wisdom that philosophy has to offer, Sidney 
says, “lies[s] dark before the imaginative and judging power if they be 
not illuminated or fi gured forth by the speaking picture of poesy.”24 
Sidney goes on to describe how religious scripture “inhabit[s] . . . 
the judgment” precisely because it functions like poetry, which is 
neither wholly conceptual (as philosophy is) nor wholly particular 
(as history is), but something in between, which illustrates universal 
precepts with specifi c instances and images:
Even our Saviour Christ could as well have given the moral commonplaces 
of uncharitableness and humbleness as the divine narration of Dives and 
Lazarus, or of disobedience and mercy as that heavenly discourse of the 
lost child and the gracious father, but that his through-searching wisdom 
knew the estate of Dives burning in hell and of Lazarus in Abraham’s 
bosom would more constantly, as it were, inhabit both the memory and 
judgment (truly, for myself, me seems I se before my eyes the lost child’s 
disdainful prodigality turned to envy a swine’s dinner), which by the 
learned divines are thought not historical acts but instructing parables.25 
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The charge of English poetry, then, is to help build a community of 
rational, moral, right-thinking people. Samuel Daniel, for instance, 
tasks poetry with “setting up the music of our times to a higher note 
of judgment and discretion” in A Defense of Rhyme (1603).26 It is 
also true, though, that bad poetry can weaken judgment. The Scot-
tish poet, courtier, and statesman William Alexander has a method 
for avoiding such problems:
When I censure any poet, I fi rst dissolve the general contexture of his 
work in several pieces, to what sinews it hath, and to mark what will 
remain behind when that external gorgeousness, consisting in the choice 
or placing of words, as if it would bribe the ear to corrupt the judgment, 
is at fi rst removed, or at least marshaled in its own degree.27 
Good poetry builds and fortifi es judgment; bad poetry erodes it. And 
since, as Wilson, Ascham, and Puttenham show us, judgment is the 
cornerstone of responsible reading – of being able to discern what 
is good and what is bad – the whole process is circular. The more 
good poetry one reads, the better equipped one will be to identify 
other examples of good poetry, and the better disposed one will be 
to produce good (moral, decorous) poetry oneself. This last point is 
important. For it is sound judgment, Henry Peacham tells us in The 
Garden of Eloquence (1577), that transforms wisdom, through the 
application of rules of decorum, into the kinds of eloquent and per-
suasive verbal packages that affect people:
Many, not perceiving the nigh and necessary conjunction of these two pre-
cious jewels [wisdom and eloquence], do either affect fi neness of speech 
and neglect the knowledge of things, or, contrariwise, covet understand-
ing and contemn the art of eloquence. And therefore it cometh to pass 
that such take great pains and reap small profi ts; they ever seek and 
never fi nd the thing they would fainest have – the one sort of these speak 
much to small purpose, and the other (though they be wise) are not able 
aptly to express their meaning. From which calamity they are free, that 
do use a right judgment in applying their studies so that their knowledge 
may be joined with apt utterance: that is to say, that their eloquence may 
be wise, and their wisdom eloquent.28 
Each of the writers mentioned above has a slightly different way of 
invoking judgment, a slightly different way of positioning it in rela-
tion to the ethical affordances of English poetry and rhetoric. What 
is clear, though, is that judgment is a practice suspended within a 
larger web of ideas about literary evaluation and invention: it is part 
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of the reading process, since all art is, or should be, rule-bound; it 
is a faculty that stands to be strengthened or weakened depending 
on what one chooses to read; and it is a mediating force between 
pure ideas and the embodiment of those ideas in a structured expres-
sive form. Prospero’s epilogue expresses a similar set of associations. 
The request for judgment is also an appeal to the audience’s capacity 
for literary invention, specifi cally its ability to craft an imaginary 
afterlife for Prospero: “release me from my bands / With the helpe of 
your good hands,” he implores; “As you from crimes would pardon’d 
be, / Let your Indulgence set me free.” According to the terms set by 
Prospero, then, clapping is an act both evaluative and generative, a 
verdict on the past and a vision for the future.
Judgment and Responsibility
With these cultural-historical coordinates in place, I want now to 
pose a larger question. Not just, what are the sources and contexts 
for the link between judgment and invention, but instead, what are 
the effects and implications of such a pairing for the audience and 
for our own understanding of the nature of theatrical experience? 
One thing is certain: bringing judgment and invention together as 
Prospero does gives theatergoers a different kind of ethical stake in 
the play they are watching than would otherwise be the case. As 
fellow makers, rather than just consumers, the audience’s collective 
sense of the good, of what is right and what is wrong, is implicated 
in the play’s imagined conclusion, and all the more so for the moral 
freight Prospero so insistently attaches to the epilogue. Viewed from 
this perspective, judgment develops less out of an evaluative impulse 
and more out of a sense of responsibility to communal norms (norms 
which are both moral and aesthetic). Not to judge, accordingly, 
would be a failure of responsibility. In the fi nal section of this chapter, 
I will delve deeper into the ethical dimension of theatrical judgment. 
My guides in this undertaking will be Hannah Arendt, the thinker 
who more than anyone else sought to understand the conceptual link 
between judgment and responsibility, and Jacques Rancière, the most 
infl uential commentator on the relationship between political and 
literary form. 
Arendt became interested in judgment when she covered the 
1961 trial of Nazi leader Adolf Eichmann for The New Yorker. Her 
articles were later expanded into the book, Eichmann in Jerusalem: 
A Report on the Banality of Evil (1963). Arendt was profoundly 
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underwhelmed by Eichmann. She thought he was forgettable, unin-
telligent, unfrightening. She was also critical of the trial itself. It 
seemed to her a show trial, one that used Eichmann as a proxy to 
condemn and punish antisemitism in general. Against this method of 
retribution, Arendt argued that the Holocaust called for specifi c and 
nuanced forms of condemnation, mostly of Nazis, but also of Jew-
ish leaders who cooperated with the Nazis. That this did not happen 
represented for her a “fundamental problem” common to “all these 
postwar trials,” which had to do with “the nature and function of 
human judgment.” She writes,
What we have demanded in these trials, where the defendants had com-
mitted “legal” crimes, is that human beings be capable of telling right 
from wrong even when all they have to guide them is their own judg-
ment, which moreover happens to be completely at odds with what they 
must regard as the unanimous opinion of all those around them. . . . 
Since the whole of respectable society had in one way or another suc-
cumbed to Hitler, the moral maxims which determine social behavior 
and the religious commandments – “Thou shalt not kill!” – which guide 
conscience had virtually vanished. Those few who were still able to tell 
right from wrong went really only by their own judgments, and they did 
so freely; there were no rules to be abided by, under which the particular 
cases with which they were confronted could be subsumed. They had to 
decide each instance as it arose, because no rules existed for the unprec-
edented.29 
Judgment for Arendt, in other words, is not an expression of external 
social or legal norms, but rather an expression of personal responsi-
bility. So long as you are human, there is an expectation that you will 
be able to tell “right from wrong.” 
What postwar trials like Eichmann’s threw into sharp relief for 
Arendt was the degree to which so many were willing to shirk this 
responsibility, either by refusing to judge or by issuing a sort of 
judgment that was so broad, so resistant to the concrete threshold 
between right and wrong, that it amounted to non-judgment. Arendt 
describes the phenomenon as follows:
Another such escape from the area of ascertainable facts and personal 
responsibility are the countless theories, based on non-specifi c, abstract, 
hypothetical assumptions – from the Zeitgest down to the Oedipus com-
plex – which are so general that they explain and justify every event 
and every deed . . . Among the constructs that “explain” everything 
by obscuring all details, we fi nd such notions as a “ghetto mentality” 
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among European Jews; or the collective guilt of the German people, 
derived from an ad hoc interpretation of their history; or an equally 
absurd assertion of a kind of collective innocence of the Jewish people. 
All these clichés have in common that they make judgments superfl uous 
and that to utter them is devoid of all risk.30 
Arendt understood the reluctance of both Germans and Jews to 
examine closely what took place in Europe between 1933 and 1945, 
to pinpoint defi nitively the many groups and individuals – Nazi offi -
cers and bureaucrats, “Christian churches,” members of “the Jewish 
leadership” – who had a hand in what she calls “the totality of moral 
collapse.” However, she concludes that “this understandable disin-
clination is insuffi cient to explain the reluctance evident everywhere 
to make judgments in terms of individual moral responsibility.”31
In the years following her coverage of the Eichmann trial, Arendt 
fi nally did arrive at an explanation. In an essay called “Personal 
Responsibility Under Dictatorship,” she recalls, “I was told that 
judging itself is wrong: no one can judge who had not been there.”32 
At the heart of this fi ercely neutral stance, Arendt decided, was deep 
skepticism about the possibility of human freedom:
There exists in our society a widespread fear of judging that has nothing 
whatever to do with the biblical “Judge not, that ye be not judged,” . . . 
For behind the unwillingness to judge lurks the suspicion that no one is 
a free agent, and hence the doubt that anyone is responsible or could be 
expected to answer for what he has done. . . . we’re all alike, equally bad, 
and those who try, or pretend that they try, to remain halfway decent are 
either saints or hypocrites, and in either case should leave us alone.33 
What Arendt does brilliantly in her writings on judgment is to trian-
gulate between three large, diffi cult concepts – judgment, responsi-
bility, and freedom – in a way that deepens our understanding of all 
three. Judgment is an expression of responsibility and responsibility, 
in turn, is a condition of being a free agent capable of moral decision 
and active worldmaking. Viewed thus, judgment is a way of mani-
festing our status as free agents in moral terms – in terms, that is, of 
a collective obligation to the good that only a free agent could enter 
into. The refusal to judge is troubling to Arendt because it indicates 
an unwillingness to be accountable for the world we all must share. 
It rehearses a vision of politics as something that works upon rather 
than through human actors and in this way advances precisely the 
sort of detached acquiescence that forms the necessary conditions 
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for totalitarian disasters like the Third Reich. That “judgment itself 
is wrong was Eichmann’s own argument against the district court’s 
judgment,” Arendt is careful to remind her readers.34
Arendt’s work on the Eichmann trial establishes a framework for 
thinking about judgment that helps us uncover some of the politi-
cal deep-structure of Prospero’s epilogue. Specifi cally, she equips us 
with a vocabulary and a set of concepts that allow us to think about 
the audience’s evaluative response in The Tempest as an expression 
of responsibility rather than authority, and therefore as something 
grounded in, and oriented toward, sociality and recognition. This has 
the effect of lifting Prospero’s epilogue out of the historically specifi c 
world of Renaissance drama and rhetorical theory and reframing it 
in terms of the ethical dynamics of participatory politics. It shows us, 
in other words, that at the heart of Prospero’s judgment–invention 
linkage is an implicit assumption that the playgoers assembled in the 
theater are free agents and therefore not just able to judge, but also 
expected to judge. For it is through judgment that they shape the 
moral contours of the future – Prospero’s future. 
On a pragmatic level, of course, the clap-to-free-me-from-my-
island conceit is simply a trick to help ensure that the audience will 
indeed clap. But even if this passage is not political by design, it is 
still political in form. This, Jacques Rancière has argued infl uentially, 
is the most important way in which literature and theater are always 
political. He writes,
The politics of literature is not the same thing as the politics of writers. 
It does not concern the personal engagements of writers in the social or 
political struggles of their times. Neither does it concern the way writers 
represent social structures, political movements or various identities in 
their books. The expression “politics of literature” implies that litera-
ture does politics simply by being literature . . . It assumes that there is 
an essential connection between politics as a specifi c form of collective 
practice and literature as a well-defi ned practice of the art of writing.35 
Likewise, we could say that theater does politics simply by being the-
ater, or, more specifi cally, that theatrical epilogues do politics simply 
by being theatrical epilogues. “It is not enough that there be power 
for there to be politics,” Rancière reminds us. “It is not even enough 
that there be laws regulating collective life. What is needed is a con-
fi guration of a specifi c form of community.”36 Prospero’s epilogue 
embodies politics precisely through the “specifi c form of commu-
nity” it establishes – a community of judgment founded on shared 
responsibility and the collective freedom to craft a world.
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Prospero’s epilogue establishes a point of intersection for a 
variety of different forces at work in English Renaissance theater. 
It indexes not only the material and economic conditions of play-
writing and performance, but also the cultural sources and ethical 
implications of collective discernment. For this reason, the epi-
logue places a particular demand on us as scholars, insisting that 
we practice a pluralistic and intellectually non-partisan criticism. 
This involves attending to both theater-historical and intellectual-
historical contexts of audience judgment – the way Prospero’s fi nal 
speech is shaped by the conventions of playgoing, but also, in a 
more general way, by Renaissance legal culture and a long tradition 
of rhetorical theory. At the same time, while all this tells us where 
Prospero’s epilogue came from, it tells us very little about what it 
makes possible, conceptually and experientially, in the theater and 
in the world. To begin to address this question, we have to attend to 
the way audience judgment generates its own context by mobilizing 
that unique confi guration of agency and accountability that is com-
mon to political and theatrical form.
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